the Supreme Court allowed a lower court ruling to go into effect that deemed same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional. However, the holdings in Windsor and Hollingsworth reveal a tension in the Court's interpretation of standing. In both cases, a third party attempted to appeal a lower court ruling, but only in Windsor was the third party found to have met the standing requirement. 4 In Hollingsworth, Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion held that several proponents of a California proposition lacked standing to appeal the lower court order, given that the Attorney General and Governor of California agreed that the proposition in question was unconstitutional. 5 Similarly, in Windsor, President Obama agreed with the Second Circuit ruling below that the federal government had acted unconstitutionally in defining marriage exclusively as the union of one man and one woman; 6 however, unlike the ruling in Hollingsworth, the Court found standing for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group ("BLAG") of the U.S. House of Representatives to 1 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) . 2 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) ("DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, . . . that [same-sex] marriage is less worthy than the marriages of others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.").
defend DOMA. 7 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented here, on the grounds that, first, the President had no standing to appeal a Second Circuit ruling with which he agreed, and second, that BLAG lacked standing to appeal as a third party to the case. 8 As a matter of standing, we agree with Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Hollingsworth and Justice Scalia's dissent in Windsor. Private busybodies lack standing in federal court to defend statutes denied defenses by federal or state executive officials. Nonetheless, we disagree with the four conservative Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court on the merits of the same-sex marriage issue and agree with Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's decision in Windsor and Obergefell that DOMA and state bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional.
There remains the issue of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The federal jurisdictional problems with cases challenging the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans are much more complex than is even recognized in the conservative Justices' opinions in Windsor and Hollingsworth. There is a serious question under current case law as to whether the federal courts have either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction to decide any pure same-sex marriage cases. 9 This dilemma stems from the longstanding domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction that goes back to the founding of the Republic; pure marriage-law cases cannot be heard in federal court. 10 We conclude that the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction ought to be read as not applying to marital-status cases. Instead, we would confine the exception to purely religious matters, such as excommunication. 7 See id. at 2684-85, 2689. 8 See id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 9 See, e.g., Chevalier v. Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 804 (6th Cir. 2015) (determining that the domestic relations exception did not bar the Appellant from commencing an action in diversity against her female partner). 10 See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 697-701, 703 (1992); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States."). See generally Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV 1787, 1822 (1995) ("The domestic relations exception reflected the view that family law constituted a distinctly communitarian endeavor, a subject reflecting locally shared values and norms.").
A. Pure Marriage Laws and the Question of "Cases in Law or
Equity" The U.S. Constitution and the federal statutes on diversity and federal question jurisdiction all employ the terminology "cases in law or equity" in their grants of federal jurisdiction to the Article III courts. Accordingly, the federal courts are restricted to hearing cases that fall under that category. The scope of the domestic relations exception becomes relevant when trying to assess whether cases revolving purely around questions of marital status can be considered as "cases in law or equity," and can thereby be heard in federal court. When state laws criminalized same-sex marriage, there was no federal jurisdiction issue because criminal cases were law-or-equity suits. However, cases challenging the federal constitutionality of state laws that only define the status of marriage are not so definitively determined, leaving room for debate as to whether such cases were appropriately be heard in federal court.
In England during 1787, "Cases in Law and Equity" was a legal term of art that encompassed only those cases that were brought before the Courts of Law (the Court of King's Bench or the Court of Common Pleas) and the Courts of Equity (the Court of Exchequer or the Court of Chancery).
11
At the time, matrimonial causes were only heard in the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England, and it was not until the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 that the ordinary English courts were empowered to hear matrimonial and divorce cases. 12 This was partly because, prior to 1857, marriage in England was considered to be a strictly religious sacrament and not a contract. 13 Marriage was similarly viewed in the United States when Article III was enacted.
14 By 1868, however, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the idea of marriage had evolved. Marriage was thought of as both a sacrament and a contract, as Andrea Matthews and Steven See id. at 4. 14 See Dailey, supra note 10, at 1821 ("From the earliest days of the Republic . . . , family law has unquestionably belonged to the states.").
Calabresi argue in their article, "Originalism and Loving v. Virginia," and Article III had been the "Supreme Law of the Land" for seventy-nine years. 15 Under Article III, matrimonial causes were not "cases in law and equity," and, although the Fourteenth Amendment created new rights, it did not add to the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts, which mandated that pure matrimonial causes (or domestic relations cases, as called by modern-day courts) be adjudicated exclusively in state courts. 16 Consequently, many contend that a Fourteenth Amendment argument against same-sex marriage bans can only be addressed by state courts, each state determining for itself how the Fourteenth Amendment is to be understood within its own borders. 17 Under this reasoning, the Supreme Court would not have had jurisdiction to overturn state bans on same-sex marriage in Obergefell in June of 2015.
We conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court ought to overrule the so-called domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. We make this argument while noting that under American federalism, the law of marriage and divorce is in "pith and substance" a question of state law and not one of federal law. Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66, 3 S.C.R. 837 (2011) (discussing the pith and substance test in Canadian federalism cases). The Canadian Supreme Court and, prior to 1949, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sitting in London, England, have long decided Canadian federalism cases by asking whether a statute is "in pith and substance" a matter of Canadian federal law or a matter of Canadian provincial law. Id. We think this doctrine is a very useful one, and we would urge the U.S. Supreme Court to apply the "pith and substance" test in U.S. federalism cases.
power to adopt a federal marriage statute. It thus may seem to follow that the very same Constitution, which leaves the definition of marriage to the states, would also prohibit the Article III federal courts from hearing matrimonial causes or domestic relations cases. However, we reject that argument and demonstrate that an originalist understanding of the word "equity" supports the exercise of judicial power to extend federal jurisdiction over domestic relations.
B. Our Framework
In this article, we argue that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia were right on the federal jurisdictional issues in Windsor and Hollingsworth. In Part I, we maintain that, first, litigants cannot appeal decisions with which they agree, and second, that private busybodies in the House of Representatives lack standing to appeal a ruling legalizing same-sex marriage under federal law. In Part II, we expand on that argument and explain why third parties lack standing to defend the constitutionality of state-adopted initiatives when the executive branch of the state governments so decline.
Finally, in Part III, we discuss the much broader federal jurisdictional problems with lawsuits like Windsor and Hollingsworth alluded to in this introduction. The case in Hollingsworth, in particular, could be argued to be absolutely not one in law or equity that could be heard by Article III federal courts. Nevertheless, after considering this argument at some length, we reject this idea and conclude that Article III's grant of equity jurisdiction has inherent evolutive meaning, and hence may expand to cover deficiencies in the law. In today's world, the federal courts' jurisdiction over cases in equity arising under federal law is best understood as encompassing marital-status lawsuits, like the various same-sex marriage cases decided on the merits by federal courts of appeals. Thus, we close this article by calling on the U.S. Supreme Court to eliminate the lingering features of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. the Obama Administration sought to appeal a Second Circuit holding with which it agreed to the effect that DOMA was unconstitutional. 20 The Administration argued that since it was continuing to enforce DOMA 21 and had been ordered to pay Windsor a tax refund, it suffered sufficient legal injury to permit an appeal of the Second Circuit's legal ruling, despite agreeing with the holding on the merits.
22
To understand the Administration's claim, it is necessary to describe the background and procedural posture of the Windsor case.
DOMA was adopted in 1996.
23
Section 3 of the Act amended the Dictionary Act to provide for a federal definition of the words "marriage" and "spouse" wherever they appeared in the U.S. Code.
24
Under DOMA, the word "marriage" in federal law was defined to mean "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife . 24 See DOMA § 3 (amending 1 U.S.C. § 7). 25 Id.
26
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 27 Id.
28
Id.
exemption from the federal estate tax," so she paid $363,053 in federal inheritance taxes and sought a subsequent refund from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").
29
The IRS denied her request, also because of DOMA.
30
Windsor then sued the United States in the Southern District of New York, contending that DOMA was unconstitutional.
31
The Obama Administration "notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 530D, that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of DOMA's § 3"; however, the President did direct his administration to continue DOMA's enforcement. 32 The stated rationale for this order was to facilitate judicial review of DOMA's constitutionality. 33 Consequently, BLAG voted to intervene in this case in order to defend the constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA.
34
The district court allowed BLAG to intervene as an interested party.
B. Windsor's Federal Standing: An Exception to the General
Taxpayer Rule In the 1920's the United States Supreme Court established the general rule that taxpayers do not have standing in federal court to challenge the constitutionality of a tax or expenditure of government funds.
36
The Court's decision rejects taxpayer standing where there is no particularized, individual legal injury. 37 This case reaffirms that the federal courts do not sit to correct generalized grievances and that not all deprivations of constitutional rights can be litigated in federal court. Though the federal courts have the power to protect rights that were recognized at common law or in the English Courts of Exchequer or Chancery, they are not ombudsmen with a general charter to police and enforce the Constitution. 
30
31
32
Id. at 2683-84; see also 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a) (2012 Windsor's injury was, therefore, not generally suffered by all taxpayers, and her payment of the tax could be resolved by actual remedy through a court order in her favor. For this reason, Windsor was an exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing, and she did have standing to challenge § 3 of DOMA in the district court.
C. The Obama Administration's Lack of Federal Standing
The district court ruled in Windsor's favor and held that § 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.
51
The Obama Administration agreed, but appealed to the Second Circuit, apparently hoping to lose in a larger jurisdiction.
52
The Second Circuit agreed that § 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional and affirmed, and the Obama Administration appealed again, 53 this time to the U.S. Supreme Court, hoping to finally lose nationwide. The actions of the Obama Administration raise the question of whether a litigant can appeal a court judgment that he or she finds to be legally correct on the basis that complying with the judicial ruling would impose financial costs on the litigant.
As exhibited by the Correspondence of the Justices, the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear only certain categories of "cases" and "controversies," 54 which involve legally adverse parties at all stages of litigation, including on appeal. refund. 56 The majority in Windsor held that this was sufficient to give the United States standing to appeal the district court's and Second Circuit's orders. 57 As Justice Kennedy said:
The judgment in question orders the United States to pay Windsor the refund she seeks. An order directing the Treasury to pay money is 'a real and immediate economic injury,' indeed as real and immediate as an order directing an individual to pay a tax. That the Executive may welcome this order to pay the refund if it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it wants does not eliminate the injury to the national Treasury if payment is made, or to the taxpayer if it is not. The judgment orders the United States to pay money that it would not disburse but for the court's order. . . . Windsor's ongoing claim for funds that the United States refuses to pay thus establishes a controversy sufficient for Article III jurisdiction. 58 The majority argued that the financial cost of the refund sufficed as an injury incurred by the United States, satisfying the prerequisite of "controversy"; 59 however, this argument is flawed because the United States did not take the position that it was legally injured by the district court's or Second Circuit's orders to refund Windsor. Though there did exist a controversy between the United States and Windsor because the Obama Administration refused to follow the law as ordered by the courts, there was no controversy between the parties over what the law entailed. Both parties agreed that the United States was legally obligated to pay Windsor $363,053, and there is no federal judicial power to review the correctness of a district court's decision unless the United States explicitly asks the court to do so. Here, the United States did not make such a request of the Court.
The United States' failure to follow through with obeying the district court's judgments may have created enough adverseness to support appellate jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directing 56 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684-86. 57 Id. at 2688-89. 58 Id. at 2686 (citation omitted). 59 See id. at 2685-86. the government to pay Windsor. That Windsor was injured by the United States' failure to pay means that there was federal judicial power to enforce the district court's judgment. 60 Nonetheless, it does not follow that such a failure would have also created jurisdiction for the Court to revisit the question of whether the United States' denial of the refund was constitutional. Accordingly, there was no case or controversy here. Windsor was a feigned case by the Obama Administration seeking an advisory opinion, just like the Correspondence of the Justices and Hayburn's Case.
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, the majority erred because it assumed it is the province and duty of the judiciary to always declare the law, However, the statement in Marbury was made in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court having to decide a bona fide case or controversy that was already properly before the Court.
63
In the setting of such a bona fide case or controversy, it is indeed the province and duty of the judiciary to determine the law. Nevertheless, the issue in Windsor was whether such a bona fide case or controversy even existed, so the Marbury dicta could not apply.
The majority also assumed that the federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate any question of United States constitutional meaning, and, as Justice Scalia argued, this concept, too, is mistaken.
64
As is made clear in Frothingham and Mellon, there are many questions of constitutional meaning that are not justiciable by the federal courts and that, therefore, must be left to the political branches of government.
65
American-style judicial review does not empower the 60 
See id.

61
See id. at 2697-2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have no power to decide this case."). 
63
See id. at 147-49. 64 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697-2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 65 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 600 (2007) (Alito, J.) ("Because the interests of the taxpayer are, in essence, the interests of the public at large, deciding a constitutional claim based solely on taxpayer standing 'would be [,] not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923))); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wild-United States Supreme Court to enforce or interpret the Constitution in the way that constitutional courts are so empowered in Germany or in other foreign nations.
66
There is no judicial review clause or constitutional interpretation clause in the U.S. Constitution, and Article III empowers the federal courts to decide only "cases" or "controversies" using the "judicial" power.
67
Windsor did not present a case or controversy about § 3 of DOMA because the United States agreed with the judgments delivered by the courts below, and there is no standing for a party to appeal a court judgment with which it agrees, seeking to lose again on appeal in a grander arena.
D. BLAG's Lack of Federal Standing
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR
LEGISLATIVE STANDING Justice Alito agreed with Justice Scalia that the Obama Administration lacked standing to appeal Windsor, but he took the position that BLAG had standing to appeal the Second Circuit's judgment because a majority of the House of Representatives approved the appeal. 68 Justice Alito asserted that each House of Congress has a life, 504 U.S. 555, 559-66, 576 (1992) (denying standing to environmental protection groups challenging a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior for failure to sufficiently assert personal injury, and noting that " [v] indicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive" (emphasis in original)); Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) ("[T]he courts have no power to consider in isolation and annul an act of Congress on the ground that it is unconstitutional; but may consider that question 'only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act.'"). See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2711-14 (Alito, J., dissenting). In this view, the case involved three parties, two of which are the United States: the House of Representatives v. Windsor and he Executive Branch. While the President found DOMA unconstitutional, the House of Representatives disagreed and fought for DOMA's defense. However, the power to defend federal legislation in court lies outside the power of Congress for good reason. A power for Congress to defend its own laws would upset the balance of powers laid out by the Constitution. The principle of the separation of powers is essential to our country's foundation, as judicially cognizable interest in defending the constitutionality of federal laws in federal court when the President finds the laws unconstitutional and declines their enforcement.
69
In this way, Justice Alito seemingly shares in Justice Kennedy's presumption that federal courts have the same power enjoyed by constitutional courts in other countries to interpret and enforce the Constitution in all contexts, and this view is deeply mistaken.
The United States federal courts were not set up to be constitutional ombudsmen, or public advocates charged with investigating and addressing complaints of maladministration. There is no clause in Article III that can be plausibly read to be so empowering, as Article III grants to federal courts the power to hear six enumerated categories of controversies, including controversies to which the United States is a party and controversies among two or more states. The six controversies stipulated in Article III, Section 2 are as follows:
The The historical reasoning for this jurisdictional distinction is rooted in the British court system. In our opinion, based on Professor Calabresi's knowledge of English legal history in 1787, admiralty cases in Great Britain were heard by special admiralty courts without jury trials; "cases in law" were heard by the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer; and "cases in equity" were heard by the Court of Chancery and the Court of Exchequer.
84
Neither the Law Courts nor the Court of Chancery had jurisdiction to hear lawsuits brought by a House of Parliament against the King for the King's failure to faithfully execute Parliament's acts. 85 It thus makes sense that, in his opinion, Justice Alito did not point to an instance from 1789 to the present day in which the federal courts heard a case like the controversy he suggested between BLAG and Windsor. Such a case could never have been heard, either in England or in the United States.
There is one prior United States Supreme Court precedent, INS v. Chadha, in which the House of Representatives did have standing to challenge an executive branch failure to execute a law. stay of deportation pursuant to a statute that provided for a onechamber legislative veto. 87 The Court found that it had jurisdiction to hear this case and held on the merits that all legislative vetoes are unconstitutional.
88
The
90
In contrast, the two chambers of Congress in Windsor did not have a statutory legal right to sue in federal court when the President declined to execute a law that he thought was unconstitutional. The House of Representatives can impeach a President who it thinks is not faithfully executing the law, but it cannot sue him seeking an injunction from a court anymore than the State of Massachusetts can sue the federal government over an unconstitutional spending bill or over the EPA's exercise of its law-enforcement discretion.
3. THE PRESIDENTIAL DUTY Article II, Section III, of the U.S. Constitution obligates the President to "take [c] The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. 96 Hence, the enumerated power in Article II, Section III, imposes a duty on the President to execute laws that he or she believes to be constitutional, not laws that Congress believes to be constitutional. To be blunt, a 5-4 standing holding from 1939 that was dependent on the votes of four pre-New Deal Supreme Court Justices is a dubious source of legal authority at best, especially in the face of the contrary opinion by Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, Black, and Douglas. The standing holding of Coleman is not well-reasoned and has barely been followed.
102
As a general matter, neither state nor federal majorities of legislative houses have brought lawsuits in the federal courts. Article III simply does not create federal jurisdiction over these kinds of controversies. 
CONCLUSION ON BLAG'S LACK OF STANDING
Given the text of Article III and the last 226 years of practice, we think Justice Alito's argument for BLAG's standing is poorly reasoned and unpersuasive. If followed, it would revolutionize our form of government by inserting the federal courts into the middle of political disputes between the President and the two houses of Congress over how to best execute the laws. This is not a road the U.S. Supreme Court ought to follow.
E. Prudential Standing Principles
The final argument for standing in Windsor is Justice Kennedy's claim that prudential standing principles suggest federal jurisdiction be exercised here.
103
This argument also fails. The prudential limits on standing in the federal courts are judicially created doctrineswhich can be overridden by Congress-that generally bar thirdparty standing and the litigation of both generalized grievances that are shared by all citizens and statutory matters that are not within the zone of interest of a statute.
104
Congress cannot override the core Article III standing requirements, which are implicit in the case or controversy requirement, and the federal courts have no power to waive standing rules for prudential reasons merely because the Justices want to hear a particular case.
F. Considering "Legal Injury"
The Court has said that Article III allows a litigant to have standing to sue in federal court only when a party has suffered a "legal injury" that is: 1) "concrete and particularized"; 2) "actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; 3) "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"; and 4) likely to be prevented or redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 105 As discussed above, Windsor suffered such a legal injury when she was denied a spousal exemption from the inheritance tax. Obama Administration and ruled that § 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.
In our opinion, a party cannot be legally injured by a court ruling that he or she supports, even if complying with that decision imposes financial costs on the party. Similarly, a party cannot appeal from a decision that he or she supports with the hopes of losing in a larger jurisdiction. 107 Consider, for example, the case of a taxpayer who agrees with the federal government that he owes the IRS $35,000 in income taxes. Such a taxpayer does not have standing to sue the government, even though compliance with the tax code will cost him $35,000. A taxpayer does not suffer a "legal injury" when he is assessed for taxes that he agrees he owes, and there is an important distinction between actions that may "harm" or "burden" an individual and actions that do cause "legal injury."
The United States did not suffer a "legal injury" when the district court ruled that the United States owed Windsor a $363,053 tax refund precisely because the Obama Administration agreed with the Court's determination. Absent a legal injury, the United States did not have standing to appeal to the Second Circuit or to the United States Supreme Court. The United States' failure to pay Windsor only meant that Windsor had standing to request the issuance of a writ of mandamus, ordering that she finally be paid the refund. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1980) ("Ordinarily, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statutory right to appeal therefrom." However, "[i]n an appropriate case, appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of Art. III."). Constitution.
II. THE THIRD-PARTY APPELLANTS IN HOLLINGSWORTH
109
In the wake of the ruling, a number of same-sex couples were legally married in California; however, later that year, California voters passed Proposition 8, a statewide initiative that amended the California State Constitution to again ban same-sex marriage.
110
In response to the ban, two same-sex couples, Kristin Perry and Sandra Stier, and Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo, brought this lawsuit in federal district court after being prohibited to marry by California state officials.
111
Though the California Governor and State Attorney General refused to defend the constitutionality of Proposition 8 in court, the district court permitted the official proponents of the initiative, which included State Senator Dennis Hollingsworth, to do so as intervenors. 112 Ultimately, the district court held Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional, and the Governor and Attorney General of California declined to appeal. 113 Nonetheless, Hollingsworth and a bevy of private busybodies did purport 114 to appeal to the Ninth Circuit to defend the constitutionality of the proposition.
115
The Ninth Circuit doubted whether Hollingsworth had standing to appeal the district court ruling and, thus, certified the following question to the California State Supreme Court:
Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative's validity or the authority to assert the State's interest in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its 109 In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, the Justices raised doubts that initiative proponents "have a quasi-legislative interest in defending the constitutionality of the measure they successfully sponsored." 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse to do so. 116 The California Supreme Court ruled that Hollingsworth did have standing to appeal the district court's order, and the Ninth Circuit accepted that conclusion and ruled in favor of Perry's same-sex marriage claim.
See In re
117
Hollingsworth then appealed the Ninth Circuit ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
B. Hollingsworth's Lack of Standing
Reflecting on the Court's definition of "legal injury" discussed in Part II, it is quite clear that Hollingsworth, as a third party to the litigation, did not suffer such a legal injury. This poses the question of whether a third party may sue in federal court seeking enforcement of a federal statute, to which we answer no. In this Part, we argue that the U.S. Supreme Court was correct in overruling the California Supreme Court's finding of standing. Third parties are not empowered to seek enforcement of federal law, and thus, Hollingsworth did not have standing to sue in federal court. The President is to have the laws executed. He may order an offense then to be prosecuted. If he sees a prosecution put into a train which is not lawful, he may order it to be discontinued and put into a legal train. . . . There appears to be no weak part in any of these positions or inferences. 126 It follows that no third party has standing to challenge a presidential or Justice Department decision to forego a prosecution. Before federal death-row prisoner Gary Gilmore was executed by a firing squad in 1977, his mother was denied standing when she attempted to argue that the execution was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
LAW ENFORCEMENT IS THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF
127
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was Gary Gilmore's exclusive right to bring the claim, that Gilmore waived that right by asking to be executed, and that his mother lacked standing to raise the claim on his behalf. defendant who is prosecuted has standing to raise constitutional arguments in his or her defense; this rule also pertains to state criminal prosecutions.
129
Third parties also lack standing to sue for the enforcement of other federal or state laws when the government denies their enforcement. This point is illustrated by the response to President Obama's recent executive action. On June 15, 2012, the President ordered that the removal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) not be enforced against an estimated population of between 800,000 and 1.4 million individuals who were illegally present in the United States.
130
This unilateral exercise of presidential prosecutorial discretion had the effect of writing into federal law the so-called "DREAM Act," 131 a bill consistently blocked by Congress since 2001. Notwithstanding the dramatic scope of the President's action, the deportation advocates do not have standing to challenge the President's action in federal court. Although private litigants may be dismayed by presidential exercises of law enforcement discretion, such parties are not "legally injured" by the executive action and, therefore, have no legal right to sue over the Executive's exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
These same principles apply to State Senator Hollingsworth's attempt to appeal the district court's holding that California's Proposition 8 was unconstitutional when neither the Governor nor the Attorney General of California agreed to enforce the law. State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney. When required by the public interest or directed by the Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office. 134 It is unquestionable whether the Governor and Attorney General of California have the exclusive right to execute-or to direct the execution of-all laws, criminal and civil, in the State of California. Indeed, the Governor has the explicit power and duty to make sure "that the law is faithfully executed," and no third parties can legally assume this role.
HOLLINGSWORTH DID NOT SUFFER A LEGAL INJURY
The "legal injury" claimed by Hollingsworth is not the sort of traditional legal injury for which litigants in federal court have ever been entitled to sue in American history. Hollingsworth alleged to have suffered an injury when same-sex couples were granted marriage licenses in California in defiance of Proposition 8; however, the federal courts do not generally allow people to sue when they 134 Id. § 13.
are disgruntled by another's matrimony. 135 If our child or close friend chooses to marry someone of whom we disapprove, we may be very upset, but this discontent does not amount to "a legal injury" over which we can sue in federal court. Not a single reported case grants an individual standing to sue for having morally disapproved of the marriage of another couple. A litigant would not be deemed to have suffered a legal injury in this setting, unless there was bigamy or incest involved, and even then, a court proceeding would almost certainly take place through a criminal trial in which the State Attorney General and Governor would participate. Otherwise, a private suit challenging a specific couple's marriage would be dismissed because the plaintiff had not suffered a legally cognizable injury.
Hollingsworth might have claimed another injury-that their state constitutional right to amend the state's constitution through the initiative process was denied when the Governor and Attorney General of California refused to defend Proposition 8. This claim, too, would fail. Article II, Section 8 of the California State Constitution sets out most of the provisions that govern a citizen's right to legislate by initiative.
136
It provides as follows:
(a) The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.
(b) An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution and is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all 135 See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664 ("For the reasons we have explained, petitioners have likewise not suffered an injury in fact, and therefore would ordinarily have no standing to assert the State's interests."); id. at 2668 ("We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen not to. We decline to do so for the first time here."). 136 See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election.
(c) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general election held at least 131 days after it qualifies or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election. The Governor may call a special statewide election for the measure.
(d) An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.
(e) An initiative measure may not include or exclude any political subdivision of the State from the application or effect of its provisions based upon approval or disapproval of the initiative measure, or based upon the casting of a specified percentage of votes in favor of the measure, by the electors of that political subdivision.
(f) An initiative measure may not contain alternative or cumulative provisions wherein one or more of those provisions would become law depending upon the casting of a specified percentage of votes for or against the measure.
137
Nowhere does this section suggest that the proponents of an initiative in California have the legal right to defend its constitutionality in federal court when the Governor and Attorney General of the State decline to do so.
Despite this, the California Supreme Court did hold in Perry v. Brown 138 that the proponents of Proposition 8 had standing "under California law to appear and assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure when the public officials who ordinarily defend the measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so." California based its decision on the California Elections Code and Article II, Section 8, of the California Constitution. 140 However, the plain language of Article II, Section 8 in no way supports the California Supreme Court's holding. The federal Constitution does not provide for state initiatives and referenda, nor does it give the proponents of such measures standing to defend them in federal court. To the extent that the Constitution does address the constitutional questions that are raised by initiatives and referenda, it does so in Article IV, Section 4, which states: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." However, the holding in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. did not justify standing for Hollingsworth to file suit in federal court. The right of California citizens to legislate through initiatives and referenda, as stipulated by the California Constitution, does not include an express right of action for privately interested parties to defend the constitutionality of such initiatives and referenda when the Governor and Attorney General so decline.
144
The California Supreme Court may be willing to engage in such free-style constitution rewriting, but there is no reason why the federal courts, being tribunals of limited jurisdiction, should defer to the California Supreme Court on this issue. Imagine for a moment what would likely proceed if Hollingsworth were to prevail in the instant case. County clerk registrars would be advised by the Governor and State Attorney General to defy the holding, and the federal court ruling would exist in 140 See id. at 1006-07. See id. at 149-51. Although this question is now settled as accepted precedent, Steven Calabresi thinks this decision was arguably wrong as an initial matter and that Article IV, Section 4 originally forbade direct democracy in the states. 144 See generally CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
vacuo. Whether the injury claimed by Hollingsworth could be redressed by judicial order was thus entirely speculative, and federal jurisdiction is not permissible under these circumstances, as was recognized long ago in Hayburn's Case. 145 Nevertheless, the issue of whether a litigant has suffered an actual legal injury and merits standing in federal court is a question of federal law. State court rulings as to property, contract, or tort law may, in effect, expand the range of state legal injuries for which a litigant can sue in federal court; however, while the standing inquiry may be intertwined with state law, neither Congress nor the states can create standing to satisfy the curiosity of uninjured third parties. 146 In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 147 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, addressed the question of who has standing to sue in federal court:
In limiting the judicial power to "Cases" and "Controversies," Article III of the Constitution restricts it to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law. Except when necessary in the execution of that function, courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action. This limitation "is founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines that reflect this fundamental limitation. It requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that "the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction." He bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought. To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering "injury in fact" that is 145 See generally Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792). concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury. This requirement assures that "there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the complaining party [.] " Where that need does not exist, allowing courts to oversee legislative or executive action "would significantly alter the allocation of power . . . away from a democratic form of government[.]"
148
Simply put, Hollingsworth did not face an actual or imminent legal injury because of the way in which California administered its marriage laws, and permitting the Court to adjudicate a lawsuit in the absence of such injury would threaten the government's balance of powers by granting increased oversight to the judiciary. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan correctly decided Hollingsworth.
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Hollingsworth lacked standing to appeal the judgment of the district court.
III. THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
A. The Origins of Federal Question Jurisdiction The asserted basis for federal court jurisdiction in Obergefell, Windsor and Hollingsworth is that the lawsuits were brought under the first clause of Article III, Section 2, which, as we noted in the Introduction, asserts the following: "The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . ." 
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The lower federal courts were not, however, given this broad grant of federal question jurisdiction by Congress until 1875-well after the Civil War.
152
For more than eighty years, the lower federal courts were almost exclusively confined to hearing diversity suits and admiralty cases. The language of the grant of the federal question jurisdiction was directly modeled on the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which explicitly provided for federal court diversity jurisdiction over "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity . . . ." civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." The defining phrase, "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity," remained a key element of statutory provisions demarcating the terms of diversity jurisdiction until 1948, when Congress amended the diversity jurisdiction provision to eliminate this phrase and replace in its stead the term "all civil actions."
. . . .
. . . We thus are content to rest our conclusion that a domestic relations exception exists as a matter of statutory construction not on the accuracy of the historical justifications on which it was seemingly based, but rather on Congress' apparent acceptance of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948, when the statute limited jurisdiction to "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." As the . . . [Second Circuit has] observed, "More than a century has elapsed since the Barber dictum without any intimation of Congressional dissatisfaction. . . . Whatever Article III may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congressional grant." Considerations of stare decisis have particular strength in this context, where "the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." When Congress amended the diversity statute in 1948 to replace the law/equity distinction with the phrase "all civil actions," we presume Congress did so with full cognizance of the Court's nearly centurylong interpretation of the prior statutes, which had construed the statutory diversity jurisdiction to contain an exception for certain domestic relations matters. With respect to the 1948 amendment, the Court has previously stated that "no changes of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed." With respect to such a longstanding and well-known construction of the diversity statute, and where Congress made substantive changes to the statute in other respects, we presume, absent any indication that Congress intended to alter this exception, that Congress "adopt[ed] that interpretation" when it reenacted the diversity statute. 157 The Supreme Court thus concluded that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction under the diversity statute over the tort claim of child abuse because, in 1787, that statute gave courts jurisdiction to hear only "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity," which then meant lawsuits that could be heard by the Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Chancery in Great Britain.
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As we noted earlier, suits regarding marriage, divorce, alimony, child support, and probate were heard by the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Church of England. 159 It was not until Parliament passed the Matrimonial Causes Acts of 1857 to 1878 that an ordinary court-the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes-acquired jurisdiction over family law cases. 160 In 1875, the High Court was created to try all important English cases and was given a Queens Bench Division, Chancery Division, and Family Division. 161 The Family Division then acquired jurisdiction over all matrimonial causes. grant. Second, the change in term thus did not eliminate the domestic relations exception to the diversity jurisdiction. 167 Ankenbrandt remains very much the governing case law of the present day.
In 1948, the statutes governing federal court jurisdiction were revised. 168 The federal question statute now provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 169 As with the 1948 revision of the grant of diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts have not read the 1948 revision of the federal question statute as a change or expansion in its coverage. The 1948 revision has been treated as if it were purely stylistic. In particular, the federal question grant of jurisdiction has been interpreted since 1948 to encompass the well-pleaded complaint rule of 1908.
170
Under this rule, statutory federal question jurisdiction cannot be based on a plaintiff's anticipation that the defendant may raise a federal statute in his or her defense. Instead, a federal statute must be evident on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, which must directly allege that the defendant violated the plaintiff's federal rights under the U.S. Constitution, treaties, or federal laws.
B. The Domestic Relations Exception in Modern Day
In Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the 1948 revision was purely stylistic and in no way substantive, 172 and the survival of the well-pleaded complaint rule after the 1948 revision underscores this point. As Judge Richard Posner explained 167 
Id.
168
See id. at 164 n.128 (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 700). 169 Id. at 165 n.132 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) The problem thus arises: were Obergefell, Windsor and Perry's lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans and DOMA "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity," as that language was used in the 1875 Jurisdiction and Removal Act? After much deliberation, we believe yes, they were.
Though the federal courts did not originally have the statutory federal question jurisdiction to hear cases challenging the definition of marriage, divorce, alimony, child custody, or probate, family law issues were sometimes raised in contexts where they were dispositive of a case at common law or in equity. In Reynolds v. United States,
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George Reynolds, a leader of the Mormon Church, was criminally prosecuted by the United States for the crime of bigamy, which he committed in the Utah territory.
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Bigamy violates federal law adopted under Article IV, Section 3, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to pass all needful rules and regulations for the governance of federal territories. correctly asserted federal jurisdiction over this case because the lawsuit involved a federal crime committed in a federal territory under a federal law, which arguably violated the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the First Amendment.
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The federal anti-bigamy law, section 5352 of the Revised Statutes, provided as follows:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another, whether married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.
182
As we discussed earlier, criminal cases have always been considered cases in law and equity with federal question jurisdiction, so Reynolds's criminal prosecution clearly arose under federal law. However, it is also true that the case against Reynolds rested on a federal definition of marriage. Though the case itself did not seek a redefinition of marriage to accommodate bigamy, Reynolds did pursue a constitutional free-exercise-of-religion exemption from the law against bigamy.
183
As demonstrated by Reynolds, when the United States brings a criminal case against a defendant whose defense rests on a federal constitutional right, the case qualifies as one in law or equity as those words were understood in 1787.
Criminal cases involving the family were no more covered by the domestic relations exception than were tort cases involving the family. The U.S. Supreme Court expressly held in Ankenbrandt v. Richards 184 that a tort suit brought by a divorced wife alleging the sexual abuse of her children by her former husband and his girlfriend could go forward in federal court, notwithstanding the domestic relations exception. 185 Following the reasoning of Ankenbrandt, the federal courts had jurisdiction not only to review the constitutionality of Reynolds's criminal prosecution, but also to judicially review 181 See id. at 154. The Lovings pled guilty to the criminal charge and were sentenced to one year in prison, but the sentence was suspended for twenty-five years so long as they left the State of Virginia, which they did.
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The couple eventually challenged the constitutionality of their criminal prosecution before the U.S. Supreme Court, and like in Reynolds, the Court ruled that it had federal jurisdiction to decide the case, noting that the suit was not purely matrimonial, but rather one of a criminal nature.
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In contrast, the litigation in Hollingsworth was brought by two same-sex couples who purely sought the right to marry and to marital status under the civil law without respect to any religious teachings as to who can marry whom.
190
While the Governor and Attorney General of California agreed with the same-sex litigants that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional, California did allow for domestic partnerships, which provided same-sex couples all the tangible benefits of a heterosexual marriage.
191
The legal injury suffered by the plaintiffs in Hollingsworth was, thus, not economic; instead, it was rooted in their legal status as a couple being recognized by the State of California as "a civil union" and not as "a marriage." This is today a legal cognizable injury for which one can bring a federal lawsuit, but that was not always the case as a matter of legal history.
The Court of King's Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Chancery would not have had jurisdiction in 1787 to hear a case that only challenged the legal definition of marriage, lacking a criminal or civil penalty component. Perry's case was a pure family law case, which did not arise under the "common law or in equity" as these terms were understood in 1787 or 1875. The only English courts that would have had jurisdiction to hear Hollingsworth would have been the Ecclesiastical Courts, which continued to hear all English family law cases until 186 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 187 See id. at 2-3. 188 See id. at 3. 189 See id. at 7-12. 190 See discussion supra Section III.B.2. the middle of the nineteenth century. Therefore, although Perry's family-law case arises under federal law, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment, we do not believe the lawsuit met the criteria of "equity" as per the original understanding of the federal question statute.
The litigation in Windsor differed from that of Hollingsworth in that Edith Windsor's claims involved a tort or civil penalty. We find that the federal district court did have jurisdiction over Edith Windsor's lawsuit against the United States challenging DOMA, insofar as it subjected her to a $363,053 cost that she would not have owed had she married a man instead of a woman. A suit for money damages against the government, where there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity, is clearly a "suit of a civil nature at common law or in equity" and thereby presents a federal question for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The English courts of law and equity did frequently hear suits for money damages in 1787, and thus there is nothing untoward in the district court's decision to hear Windsor's case as an initial matter, even though the government lacked standing to subsequently appeal the case.
C. Why the Court Should Expand "Equity" to Include Same-Sex
Marriage Cases Nonetheless, we should be careful about considering the original understanding of equity jurisdiction with such inflexibility as in the above analysis, for it is indisputable that equity jurisdiction first arose in England to correct injustices occurring from an overly stringent and technical application of the law. As the seventeenth-century jurist John Selden famously said:
Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? One chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: 'tis the same thing in the chancellor's conscience. 192 Equity jurisdiction is, by its nature, malleable and inherently protean, and it exists to correct rank injustices that might occur as a result of a technical and rigid application of the law. One can no more confine equity to its causes of action in 1787 than one could confine the Necessary and Proper Clause 193 to only those powers that were "necessary and proper" for executing the enumerated powers in 1787. In 1787, it was not necessary and proper for the federal government to have an air force, but it is in 2016.
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As the great jurist Robert Bork wrote, "The world changes in which unchanging values find their application." 195 The grant of equity jurisdiction by both the Federal Question Act of 1875 and the Federal Question Clause in Article III allows for a judicial power whereby the federal courts may, as a matter of conscience, intervene to correct an injustice at law in situations where changes in the facts give an old principle a new application. Though federal courts ought not take advantage of this power to expand their equity jurisdiction capriciously, it is appropriate for the federal courts to intervene when the nation is closely divided on a fundamental claim of constitutional right as to the legality of bans on same-sex marriage. As Abraham Lincoln said: "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved-I do not expect the house to fall-but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery, will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike 192 JOHN SELDEN, THE ought to be overruled. 202 Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme Court will agree when it hears its next same-sex marriage case.
There remains one final wrinkle in our argument not yet addressed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the U.S. Supreme Court has federal question jurisdiction to review final judgments rendered by the highest court of a state when a decision could be had in which the validity of a state statute is called into question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
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This provision descends from Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, referred to above, and raises the question of whether a state Supreme Court ruling on whether a state marriage statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment in a non-criminal case where no financial consequences were at stake could be heard by the U.S. Supreme Court as a case in law or equity arising under the Constitution. The answer is yes, because the U.S. Supreme Court ought to recognize a new equitable cause of action allowing domestic relations cases to be heard in federal court.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we believe that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals in Windsor and Hollingsworth for appellants' failure to establish proper standing, and that pure same-sex marriage cases are indeed cases in equity for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. We agree with the Court's conclusion in Windsor that DOMA was unconstitutional, and we applaud the ruling in Obergefell-there is a right to same-sex marriage under the Fourteenth Amendment, enforceable in federal court. We therefore agree with the Obergefell decision.
It is the nature of equity jurisdiction to evolve over time in order to correct rigidities in the common law, and in a constitutional democracy like ours, new equitable causes of action may sometimes be created by Congress, and other times, by the U.S. Supreme Court. The word "equity" in Article III has a historical gloss that allows for its extension over domestic relations cases. That exception reflects archaic, gender-discriminatory laws like coverture laws and laws 
